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Abstract
As smart contract platforms autonomously manage billions of dollars of capital, quantifying the
portfolio risk that investors engender in these systems is increasingly important. Recent work illustrates
that Proof of Stake (PoS) is vulnerable to financial attacks arising from on-chain lending and has worse
capital efficiency than Proof of Work (PoW) [1]. Numerous methods for improving capital efficiency
have been proposed that allow stakers to create fungible derivative claims on their staked assets. In
this paper, we construct a unifying model for studying the security risks of these proposals. This model
combines birth-death Po´lya processes and risk models adapted from the credit derivatives literature to
assess token inequality and return profiles. We find that there is a sharp transition between ‘safe’ and
‘unsafe’ derivative usage. Surprisingly, we find that contrary to [2] there exist conditions where derivatives
can reduce concentration of wealth in these networks. This model also applies to Decentralized Finance
(DeFi) protocols where staked assets are used as insurance. Our theoretical results are validated using
agent-based simulation.
Introduction
Proof of Stake (PoS) is a Sybil resistance mechanism that aims to replace the scarce physical resource usage
of Proof of Work (PoW) by using consensus-enforced scarcity of a digital asset. Moving from PoW to
PoS has promised to reduce mining’s energy usage, increase scalability, and improve network participation.
PoS achieves this by minting cryptographically-secured tokens according to a fixed monetary policy. Token
holders receive a pro-rata portion of inflation by staking, or locking up their tokens in a smart contract,
which lets them validate transactions that the network processes. If the entire token supply is staked, the
cost of performing a double-spend attack becomes proportional to 33% (Byzantine Fault Tolerant, BFT) or
51% (longest-chain) of the token supply. Therefore, if the value of a PoS token (relative to a nume´raire) is
large and a large fraction of the outstanding tokens are staked, the network is safe against adversaries with
capital proportional to the token’s market capitalization [1].
PoS’s threat model is, however, more complex than that of PoW as the usage of capital as a scarce
resource leads to novel financial attacks that do not exist in PoW [2, 3]. First, the compounding effects of
PoS assets, which do not exist in PoW, make it difficult to design incentive compatible monetary policies [2].
Moreover, as PoS assets require both market capitalization and staking participation to be high for security,
scenarios that keep the market capitalization high, while staking participation remains low can be dangerous
to these networks. The attacks of [3] arise in such a scenario, which occur when the system’s users and
validators are rational profit seeking agents. One enters this scenario when alternative yields (e.g. lending)
exceed PoS returns. In such scenarios, rational actors unstake their assets and migrate them to alternative
vehicles to maximize individual profit, while reducing network security. This behavior also leads to capital
flight and can cause deflationary spirals [4].
The time value of capital that is lost from locking up an inflationary monetary instrument in a smart
contract can be significant, which disincentivizes staking when there exist alternative yield-generating oppor-
tunities. In order to incentivize validator participation, staking protocols have proposed staking derivatives,
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which allow validators to borrow against their staked assets [5, 6, 7, 8]. This borrowing, which resembles
secured lending from fiat finance such as home equity loans, provides a mechanism for validators to gain
partial liquidity on their staked capital. By having the protocol provide lending services (in the form of
staking derivatives), one can potentially mitigate the capital flight issues of [3]. For instance, a validator
with 1000 tokens of a digital asset X locked in a staking contract can use a staking derivative to mint 750
tokens of a synthetic asset Y , representing a borrow of 75% of stake. At the beginning of the lien, the
synthetic asset could be redeemed one-to-one for the underlying asset. However, if the validator is slashed,
the synthetic asset will redeem for less. In this case, if the validator is slashed and loses 50 tokens, then they
may only be able to redeem 1 Y for 0.5 X.
In practice, validators share default risk with other borrowers, which is typically the case when a PoS
protocol issues fungible derivative assets, i.e. when all borrowing obligations are denominated in a common
asset. Such constructions involve issuing staking derivatives backed by the collective obligations of the
validator base. Similar aggregations are also common to DeFi lending protocols. In the MakerDAO [9]
protocol, loans are denominated in a single fungible asset, Dai, whose value depends on a pool of non-
fungible loans called “Vaults.” Similarly, lenders in Compound [10] are issued tokens (called “cTokens”) that
entitle holders to a proportional share of the interest generated by all borrowers (for example, lenders of Dai
would be issued “cDai,” whose redemption price depends on the interest accrued from all Dai-denominated
loans originated by Compound). In both PoS and DeFi, we argue that aggregating obligations from a
heterogeneous pool of borrowers into a single asset can be analogized to securitization [11]. The analogy is
more than skin-deep, as shown in §1.1 where we consider the options available to PoS protocols for creating
fungible assets representing pools of validator liens.
Unsurprisingly, as the security of a PoS system depends on the total amount of staked assets and their
relative value to a nume´raire (such as US dollars or Bitcoin), this type of borrowing will decrease the
security of the PoS system. Moreover, as illustrated in [2], PoS protocols with improperly chosen monetary
policies can lead to concentration of stake in the hands of a few, further reducing network security. But
how do we quantify this decrease in security? The above description has numerous parameters, such as
how overcollateralized a validator’s loan needs to be, what is the interest rate to charge, and how is the
redemption pricing curve constructed. To fully evaluate the safety of the system, one needs to model how
the underlying PoS asset, the synthetic derivative asset, and other lending opportunities interact with one
another. In this paper, we will construct a risk model for a broad class of staking derivatives. This model
will be analyzed through two lenses:
1. Inequality : We extend the specialized Po´lya urn model of [2] to a generalized process that represents
derivatives. Recent advances in probability allow us to analytically estimate how derivatives impact
inequality.
2. Returns and Portfolio Optimization: Under the assumption of rational validators, we study the returns
on portfolios of staked, lent, and derivative assets. We liken staking derivatives to secured loans whose
returns depend on staking yields and provide intuition via existing models from quantitative finance.
We will also evaluate these models via numerical simulation and agent-based modeling.
Agent-Based Model
We extend the agent-based framework of [3] to consider rational actors who hold portfolios of staked, lent, and
derivative assets. Participants rebalance their portfolios by maximizing a utility function, which represents
the best portfolio that one can hold given current market prices and yields. Each participant has a different
risk preference leading to non-trivial dynamics as riskier borrowers will rebalance their portfolios to be
derivative heavy, whereas risk-averse borrowers will have their portfolios be staking coin heavy. Note that
adding a derivative instrument, which represents a leveraged long claim on the underlying PoS token, adds
novel risks for validators. In particular, validators begin to default on these liens when they are slashed for
activities that are antithetical to consensus. Constructing such an instrument involves having the consensus
algorithm be aware of the current value of a validator’s debt when adjusting the monetary policy of the
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network. This is different than the situation of [3], where the lending rates are independent of the consensus
algorithm used for the PoS asset.
The main machinery that we add to allow consensus to keep track of debt prices and positions is a
constant function market maker (CFMM) [12, 13]. CFMMs are smart contracts that act as an exchange for
the staked coin and the derivative asset. The usage of CFMMs in cryptocurrencies began with Uniswap [13],
which was used for token-to-token exchanges mediated by a CFMM. Uniswap has had close to $75 million
of digital assets locked in it, demonstrating practical CFMM viability. However, CFMMs have also been
used for other financial applications such as portfolio rebalancing [14], margin trading [15], and stablecoins
[16, 17]. These simple and versatile mechanisms are parametrized by a convex function that maps asset
quantities to an implied price. This also allows them to be utilized in consensus sensitive matters. Celo [17]
incorporates a Uniswap-style CFMM in consensus to adjust the PoS protocol’s monetary policy based on
transaction demand and money velocity. When the main venue for trading a PoS asset against a lien is an
on-chain CFMM, a PoS protocol can adjust its monetary policy and execute margin calls on overleveraged
validators. Ideally, the lending activity related to a PoS token mainly comprises of validators borrowing
against their staked assets, allowing consensus to intervene and avoid the scenarios posed in [3].
If there are a number of defaults in the synthetic asset — validators borrow against their staked quantity,
but cannot repay their loans — then synthetic asset holders often share the default risk pro-rata. As a simple
example, suppose that we have 10 validators with an equal staked quantity and all of them have borrowed
against their stake. If 20% of validators default on their loans, then the remaining 80% have their borrowed
assets get 25% more expensive to close in order to cover the losses of the defaulted loan. This means that
if at time t0, the synthetic asset and the PoS asset have the same price in a CFMM, then at time tdefault,
when both defaults happen, the prices of the synthetic asset should be 75% that of the PoS asset. Thus,
the exchange rate between the underlying coin and the derivative asset should represent the expected future
defaults that the derivative will have to absorb.
We model on-chain lending in the same manner as [3] by using the Compound protocol [18]. On-chain
lending pools, where lenders share default risk pro-rata, are common in cryptocurrency financial products
such as Compound [18], Uniswap [13], and in PoS itself [3]. Such protocols rely on cryptographic properties
of smart contracts to ensure that participants are incentivized to avoid malicious behavior. This model uses
a scoring rule to price the interest rate for borrowing one cryptoasset in exchange for another as collateral
based on supply and demand. If St and Dt are the supply and demand (in tokens) for borrowing a token
at time t, these mechanisms furnish a function f : R+ × R+ → [0, 1] such that f(St, Dt) is the interest rate
changed to borrowers. The loans are overcollateralized, like home-equity loans, and the demand is driven by
crypto-asset holders who want to borrow fiat currency against their cryptocurrencies for liquidity. The largest
on-chain lending pools on Ethereum are MakerDAO [19] and Compound [18], growing to hold hundreds of
millions of dollars by early 2020. These pools have proven to be resilient and provide arbitrageurs with ample
opportunity to provide price discovery between lent assets as well as for swaps between pairs of assets.
By combining CFMMs with on-chain lending pools, we are able to focus on how rational agents rebalance
their portfolios based on information that is endogenous to the blockchain itself. Our usage of CFMMs implies
that as long as one rational arbitrageur exists, on-chain prices will match external prices [12]. Moreover,
the usage of on-chain lending pools implies that all participants can see the same rates for borrowing versus
those of staking, allowing for a direct optimization problem to be constructed. As CFMMs are parametrized
by their scoring function φ, it is instructive to consider whether such systems exist in practice.
Staking Derivatives outside of PoS
Existing research on staking primarily focuses on its use as a Sybil resistance mechanism in consensus.
However, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) applications have found novel ways to use staking outside of PoS.
DeFi applications utilize staked capital as ‘insurance funds’ and ‘security pools’ for algorithmic stablecoins,
on-chain lending, and margin trading.
Algorithmic Stablecoins are tokens with dynamic monetary policies that adjust to maintain a peg to
another asset, such as the US dollar. These assets increase their token issuance when the synthetic asset is
above the peg and decrease it by buying back the stable asset and destroying it (‘burning’). Protocols such
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as Celo [16] and Terra [20] utilize a staking token that represents both on-chain transaction fees as well as
a debt instrument. In these protocols, stakers earn interest for transaction validation, but can have their
assets diluted in order to buy back the stable asset when it is trading below its peg. Celo [16] and Terra [21]
use CFMMs to handle this dilution process. This usage of CFMMs to enforce protocol constraints fits into
the framework presented in §1.
On-chain lending protocols, such as Aave [22] and Compound [23, 18], have insurance funds that take
a fraction of earned interest and hold it in escrow. This earned interest is used to pay back lenders when
external market conditions cause failure modes such as cascading liquidations [18]. These failure modes
represent edge cases where a decentralized lending protocol is unable to sell assets to cover liabilities due to
market volatility. MakerDAO’s ‘Black Thursday’ events on March 12, 2020 represent a realized instance of
this situation [24]. As lending protocols aim to decentralize their ownership, new token models from Aave [25]
and Compound [26] require staking for participation in both the governance and insurance functions of the
system. In this use case, the insurance fund pays out stakers from received interest and dilutes the staking
token when mass defaults happen. The lending contract effectively securitizes the insurance fund via this
mechanism, allowing for a larger pool of capital to back the algorithmic loans issued. These mechanisms
resemble reinsurance and can also be analyzed using the staking derivatives framework.
Margin trading protocols such as Synthetix [27] and UMA [28] utilize a staking token that acts akin to
an exchange seat at the CME. When this token is staked in Synthetix, it is eligible for both staking rewards
and can be used as collateral for a synthetic asset. If a user wants to mint a synthetic version of the S&P
500, they need to provide a price feed and collateral (in the staking asset). Once minted, users can place
pairwise margin trading bets on whether the S&P 500 will go up or down, with the shorts paying the longs if
the asset moves up. These synthetic assets have risks that arise when the collateral value falls precipitously,
leaving the system unable to pay the winning side of a margin trade. Thus, similar to the on-chain lending
case, the staking token allows investors to earn interest when trades are settled, but possibly absorb losses
when the system is unable to pay out as expected. This is another form of a staking derivative that falls
within the framework of §1.
Finally, we note that Tezos’s ‘virtual baker’ mechanism [29] as well as the stochastic model of MakerDAO
[19] both fit into our framework, with different choices of CFMM. We will map these various uses of staking
derivatives to a CFMM pricing function in §2.1. The variety of uses of staking derivatives in PoS and DeFi
suggest that a pricing model that covers known use cases and is simple to interpret will be valuable for the
evolution of these systems. The remainder of this paper will describe the assumptions and model used to
characterize staking derivatives. We will prove some properties about this model and use numerical simula-
tion to check that these transitions exist. Finally, we conclude with a discussion about how to instantiate
the different models discussed in this section via choices of the CFMM pricing function φ.
Takeaways for PoS & DeFi protocol designers
We highlight the main results that are relevant for DeFi and PoS protocol designers. First, the results of §3
show that one can reduce inequality amongst stakers by adding staking derivatives. However, the portfolio
returns estimated in §4.5.2 show that this inequality comes at the cost of burning a significant fraction of
the money supply. These two results describe a trade-off between the number of liquidations of a derivative
position and the amount of inequality in the system. The phase transitions estimated via simulation in
these sections suggest that there is a small region of parameter space where one can balance these trade-offs
optimally. In this ‘optimal region,’ one can use a staking derivative to be the dominant form of borrowing
in the system, so that the on-chain lending attacks of [3] are ineffective. This optimal region is the portion
of the ‘safe’ regime that is closest to the phase transition boundary (see Figures 3, 5 for examples). Thus
for staking systems that admit significant leverage (e.g. Synthetix [30]), it can be crucial to ensure that
the system stays within this region. While the analytical results of §3 and §4.5.2 provide bounds on these
transitions, the precise boundary between the ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ region which is optimal can only be explored
via simulation. Figures 6b, 7b illustrates how the size of a validator’s slashed bond affects the size of the
optimal region.
The risk models used in §4 for the ‘safe’ derivative region are analogues of models used to analyze credit
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derivatives, such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS). In the MBS literature, one considers derivative
securities with ‘embedded options.’ These options correspond to homeowners deciding to prepay their
mortgage (leading to a loss of interest) or refinancing their mortgage. Accurately pricing MBSs relies on
including the value at risk to an investor when these options are exercised. Staking derivative loans can
also be thought to have embedded options that are granted to the lender (the PoS protocol) instead of the
borrower. These may involve default protections such as penalizing validators whose derivative is deemed
overleveraged, or otherwise adjusting the derivative pricing function φ on a per-user basis. Designers can
embed a notion of a ‘credit score’ in φ that allows for borrowers with good borrowing histories to mint
derivatives with lower fees. Given that a number of DeFi protocols have proposed including similar benefits
to active participants [31, 32], it is important to correctly value these embedded options when choosing
pricing curves. Claim 5 provides a technique for a wide class of staking derivatives (including all proposals in
DeFi and PoS known to the authors) for approximating the risks associates with such options. The results
of §4.3 extend credit derivative risk measures [33, Ch. 6] to staking derivatives and can be used to choose φ.
Outline
The remainder of the paper will focus on describing the staking derivatives framework. We note that
mathematical notation and details about the assumptions made about the Proof of Stake model, based on
those from [3], can be found in Appendices A and B. The main new mathematical object introduced in this
paper, the derivative pricing function φ for CFMMs, will be introduced in §1. We construct derivative pricing
functions for both PoS networks and for DeFi protocols that utilize staking mechanisms. The main difference
is that DeFi protocols rely on different boundary conditions than those of PoS networks. Subsequently, we
will construct two models that utilize φ to price derivatives: an urn model and a portfolio risk model.
The urn model of §3 will provide a way to measure concentration of wealth and inequality in the stake
distribution. In this section, we will use theoretical results on continuous-time embeddings of urn models
to measure how derivatives affect concentration of wealth. Surprisingly, our main result is that there exist
scenarios where the existence of derivatives lowers the amount of inequality in the system. We illustrate
this result theoretically by using a proxy for the Gini coefficient, the ratio of L2 to L1 norms of the stake
distribution. Subsequently, we use a simulated agent-based model to numerically verify this result under
more realistic conditions and verify that the Gini coefficient indicates a less concentrated stake distribution.
Portfolio risk is assessed in §4.1. The main results that we find are that there are ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’
regimes for both of these systems, which are characterized by features of φ and the monetary policy of the
network. When in the safe regime, we show that this model can be interpreted in a manner similar to credit
derivatives with embedded options. This interpretation allows for us to compute the expected returns for
both the validator and the protocol, as they hold portfolios of staked and borrowed assets. We further show
that in the safe region, the results of [3] on capital flight due to lending still hold.
1 Derivative Pricing Function
The main object of study in this paper is the derivative pricing function for validator i, denoted ϕi. This
function allows for pricing synthetically minted assets in terms of an underlying asset. In order to understand
how to construct ϕi, we will first need to study the function of staking derivatives.
1.1 Staking Derivatives
Consider the Tezos PoS network [34], which has been live since 2018 and whose XTZ token is the largest
PoS coin by market capitalization. Suppose that Tezos validators were allowed to borrow up to 75% of
their staked assets in the form of a synthetic XTZ, sXTZ, with value equal to the market price of XTZ at
inception. In order for a validator to recover their stake and earned block rewards, they need to buy back
their XTZ with sXTZ. Such a synthetic asset is known as a staking derivative, as it represents a lien against
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Figure 1: ϕi constructed from φ(s) =
1
sk
∧ 1 for different exponents k. The x-axis is the ratio pistake(h)pistake(hissued) .
This ratio only decreases when a validator is slashed in PoS or if a price moves against a direction in DeFi
(e.g. sUSD/SNX price goes down, even though a staker is long). The dotted line represents a collateral factor
of ci = 0.75. The loan is liquidated, represented by φ(cipistake(hissued)) = ∞. The steepness in the changes
in φ from the different exponents control how leveraged a validator is as they are increasingly slashed.
staked assets [5]. Unlike other on-chain liens,1 this liability is known to the consensus protocol, which can
ensure that if a validator has less stake than what they borrowed, they lose their assets. Note that validators
who use such liens to gain liquidity are taking leveraged long positions on the underlying asset (e.g. XTZ),
akin to a “Vault” in MakerDAO [19].
For example, suppose that a validator has 10,000 XTZ staked in the network with a collateral factor of
75%, meaning they can borrow up to 7,500 XTZ worth of sXTZ. If the current price of sXTZ is 1.01 XTZ,
then a validator borrowing maximally against 1,000 XTZ would receive 1, 000× 1.01× 0.75 = 757.5 sXTZ.
The borrowing validator can use the sXTZ as a normal token and sell it (e.g. for a stablecoin or Bitcoin),
allowing them to have increased capital efficiency and liquidity. However, in order for the borrowing validator
to reclaim their staked XTZ, they have to repurchase their stake using sXTZ. If the validator borrowed 1,010
sXTZ but was slashed, the price in sXTZ that they have to pay the network to reclaim his collateral is higher
than 1,010 sXTZ. Moreover, if the validator is slashed by 2,500 sXTZ (e.g. they have less staked than their
7,500 limit), then their loan is defaulted on and the network reclaims 1,010 sXTZ. On the other hand, if the
validator’s stake upon repaying the borrowed asset is greater than or equal to the quantity staked when the
loan was taken out, the borrower’s price remains 1,010 sXTZ. These constraints ensure that the PoS network
penalizes validators who borrow against their staked assets and perform a malicious activity (that leads to
slashing).
Let hissued be the block height that validator i minted a staking derivative against their stake at that
time pistake(hissued)i and let hclosed be the block height they closed their loan. Moreover, let ci ∈ [0, 1] be
the ith validator’s collateral factor. This represents the fraction of stake that can be borrowed against, e.g.
cipistake(h) is the fraction allowed to be borrowed. For a staking derivative to be economically sound or
solvent, the following properties are necessary:
Property 1. Default if overleveraged. If a validator borrows at block height hissued, but at height
h′ > hissued, pistake(h′)i < cipistake(hissued)i, then the network can reclaim the validator’s stake and redistribute
it as fit.
1In MakerDAO, Compound, and Synthetix, the protocol pays liquidators to buy defaulted liens, whereas a PoS currency
can simply burn a validator’s stake
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Property 2. Repayment amount bounded below. If a validator mints x sXTZ at block height hissued
then no matter what, they will always at least pay x sXTZ to regain their collateral. This ensures that the
sXTZ/XTZ price will be greater than or equal to 1, meaning that the synthetic will never be worth more than
the underlying asset.
Property 3. Monotonically increasing payment. Suppose a validator borrows x sXTZ at block height
hissued. Suppose they have to pay back x(i) sXTZ if they are slashed i times. The borrowing mechanism is
said to be monotonic in payment if x(i) is increasing in i — the more you are slashed, the more you have
to repay.
Property 4. There exists an on-chain synthetic-to-real market. In the previous example, we require
the sXTZ to XTZ price to mark the loan and to figure out much a validator needs to repay. In order for the
consensus algorithm to execute a default, it needs this market price. Moreover, borrowers need access to this
market to purchase sXTZ to close their liens.
These conditions ensure that the protocol mints derivatives that are always solvent. Note that these
conditions are analogous to those required by over-collateralized lending contracts [18] and by debt-driven
algorithmic stablecoins [4, 19]. The first condition ensures that the system’s assets (e.g. the staked coins)
are always greater than net liabilities (e.g. the derivative). The second condition ensures that there is no
economic abstraction of the underlying asset by the synthetic asset. In particular, this implies that market
will never find sXTZ to be more valuable than XTZ, which could lead stakers to borrow sXTZ against
their staked XTZ and then default. Monotonically increasing payments ensure that bad borrowers (e.g.
validators who are repeatedly slashed) have to pay the network more to borrow against their stake, as they
are providing riskier collateral to the network. Finally, the last condition ensures that borrowers can easily
buy sXTZ to repay their debt and ensures that the protocol can correctly adjust the monetary supply upon
realizing a default.
Note that while it is possible to replace the final condition with the existence of a decentralized oracle
[35] instead of an on-chain market, we argue that this is not feasible for staking derivatives. Firstly note
that decentralized oracles such as Augur [35] or Chainlink/DECO [36] rely on smart contract protocols for
their execution. Since staking derivatives are used for the base protocol’s staking asset, the smart contract
would need to run on the same network, which would cause a variety of issues. For instance, the oracle
contract could be censored by validators who have large liens that are in default, which is a form of ’miner
extractable value’ [37]. Moreover, if an oracle were used, the PoS consensus protocol would be subject to
manipulation from this oracle, as it will have security under a different threat model. Finally, we note that
while CFMMs can be manipulated, it is expensive to do so. The cost of manipulating a CFMM is linear in
the size of the liquidity pool, whereas oracle manipulation has a constant cost [13, Appendix E].
How can we enforce these constraints within the protocol? Constant function market makers (CFMM) [13,
12] provide on-chain mechanisms for pricing baskets of assets based on quantities deposited by participants.
These mechanisms rely on two principal agents: liquidity providers (LPs) and traders. Liquidity providers
lend their assets to a smart contract and upon each trade executed by a trader, receive a pro-rata share of
transaction fees. The main parameter needed to configure a CFMM is a scoring rule Φ : Rk+ → R+ that
maps a vector of quantities of assets q ∈ Rk+ to an invariant. Provided that Φ is closed and convex, one can
compute the prices of any pairs of assets. For staking derivatives, we require a function Φ : R2+ → R that
can provide the price of the synthetic asset relative to the underlying asset (e.g. sXTZ/XTZ) and satisfy the
above constraints. We note that when constructing two-asset CFMMs, it is sufficient to provide a pricing
curve ϕ : R+ → R+ to construct a CFMM Φ [13]. We provide an explicit example of such a construction in
the sequel.
2 Constructing ϕ
Before constructing ϕ, let us first look at how it is used to close out liens. Suppose that we have a validator
who has staked assets pistake(h)i at block height h, then the validator is allowed to use ϕ to mint up to
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cipistake(h)i in synthetic assets. Therefore, each validator can be thought of as holding a portfolio Π(i, h) =
(pistake(h)i,−δi) of staked assets at block height h pistake(h)i and synthetic borrowed assets δi. In order to
close out the −δi(h) position, the validator has to pay the borrowing contract ϕ(pistake(h)i). The first three
conditions from the previous section are represented as follows:
• Default if overleveraged: If ϕ(pistake(h))i < ciϕ(pistake(hissued))i then Π(i, h) = (0, 0)
• Repayment bounded below: For all h > hissued ϕ(pistake(h)i) ≥ δi
• Monotonically increasing payment: If for h, h′ > hissued we have pistake(h)i < pistake(h′)i then
ϕ(pistake(h)i) ≥ ϕ(pistake(h′)i)
Recall that in Assumptions 3 and 4, we assume that each validator has their own collateral factor ci and
probability of being slashed pi. This means that each validator should have a pricing function ϕi that depends
on their collateral factor and likelihood of being slashed. To make the borrowed asset fungible (e.g. similar to
Compound’s wrapped tokens, such as cDAI), we will need to construct ϕ as an aggregation of individual val-
idator’s pricing functions ϕi. Note that this is analogous to the ‘non-fungible’ CDPs in MakerDAO which give
rise to a ‘fungible’ synthetic token Dai. The precise form of the aggregation, such as the bounded mean aggre-
gation ϕ(pistake(t)) =
1
n
∑
i(ϕi(pistake(t)i)∧ϕmax) or ϕ(pistake(t) = Median(ϕ1(pistake(t)1), . . . , ϕn(pistake(t)n)),
does not affect our results2 and for the remainder of the paper we will focus on dealing with ϕi.
We can think of the synthetic asset as “shares” collateralized by the assets staked in the network. These
shares, which are tradeable against the underlying staked asset provide the validator with liquidity that
depends on their collateralization ratio ci and their current stake. Thus, ϕi takes in a validator’s current
stake and the stake they had when they borrowed and returns the number of shares need to buy a single
staking token. Intuitively, when a validator has more stake in the network (inclusive of rewards earned since
the loan was issued) than when she initially minted shares, the validator should be able to redeem one share
for one staking token. Moreover, when a validator has defaulted — their current stake is less than c% of the
stake when the shares were issues — the price should be infinite. Thus, if we let hissued be the block height
at which a loan was issued, we have the constraints
ϕi(pistake(h)i) = 1 if pistake(h)i > pistake(hissued)i
ϕi(pistake(h)i) =∞ if pistake(h)i < cipistake(hissued)i (1)
The specified boundary conditions encapsulate properties 1 and 2.
In order to fully specify the model, we have to describe ϕi that satisfy the boundary conditions (1) and
property 3. We will assume that for all validators i, ϕi(s) = φ(ais + bi) where φ is a ‘mother’ valuation
function3 and ai, bi are coefficients that are chosen to ensure that we satisfy (1). Furthermore, we will
assume the following properties of φ : R+ → R+:
1. φ is continuous on its domain, e.g. φ ∈ C0(R+)
2. φ restricted to (0, 1) is smooth, e.g. φ|(0,1) ∈ C∞((0, 1))
3. φ is decreasing in its argument, ∀x ∈ [0,∞), φ′(x) ≤ 0
4. Boundary conditions: φ(0) =∞, φ(1) = 1
Note that the second property, φ′(x) ≤ 0 forces us to satisfy property 3, as desired. A simple example of an
admissible φ is φ(s) = max(s−1, 1) = s−1 ∨ 1. The former assumption ensures that outside of the boundary
conditions, we have a relatively easy to deal with valuation function whose expectation can be computed
easily. Other the other hand, the latter encodes the idea that as a validator has more stake in the network,
2The form of the aggregation chosen will affect liquidity and fees, but as long as the aggregation satisfies the necessary and
sufficient conditions of [12], we can still use ϕ as a CFMM
3This terminology is adapted from the wavelet literature, where there is a ‘mother’ wavelet function that determines all of
the spatiotemporally localized basis functions [38]
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relative to their borrowed quantity, they should have to pay a decreasing number of shares to recover their
collateral. Furthermore, we note that the boundary conditions (1) are satisfied if we set ai and bi as follows:
ai =
1
pistake(hissued)i(ci − 1) (2)
bi =
ci
1− ci (3)
Note that with these parameters, ais + bi = 0 when s = cipistake(hissued)i and ais + bi = 1 when s =
pistake(hissued)i. Figure 1 provides an example of this for φ(s) =
1
sk
∧1, where you can see how the coefficients
ai, bi shift the the curve φ to the curve ϕi, with ci = 0.75.
Such linear aggregations describe a number of real-wold DeFi protocols such MakerDAO, wherein a
heterogeneous pool of loans based on different collateral assets is aggregated to a fungible asset, Dai [9]. The
obligations of all borrowers are thus denominated in the same asset. The aggregation can be thought of as
securitization [11, 39] where φ provides exposure to a pool of stake-collateralized loans represented by φi.
2.1 Other Examples of Derivative Pricing Functions
This form of the pricing function provides a general model of a redemption curve for synthetic liens that
can be adapted to support a variety of applications. For completeness, we illustrate with some examples of
real-world staking applications, including both PoS protocols and DeFi applications (where staking is not
used for consensus).
In the Synthetix protocol, users stake Synthetix Network Tokens (SNX) which serves as collateral for the
issuance of synthetic assets. The sum of all outstanding synthetic assets represents the debt of the system
the risk of which is shared among all SNX staked [30]. The security of the Synthetix protocol therefore
benefits from maintaining both higher value and staking participation in SNX. In exchange for serving as
the counterparties for synthetic asset exchanges, SNX stakers are rewarded with transaction fees generated
from the Synthetix exchange as well as new inflation. In addition, to encourage liquidity for synthetic assets,
Synthetix rewards users who contribute synthetic tokens to CFMMs such as Uniswap and Curve [32]. The
scenario where SNX stakers borrow synthetics against their staked supply and ‘lend’ these to an on-chain
CFMM corresponds to the model in §4. In this scenario, φi is simply the ratio of the price of SNX to
the price of the synthetic asset times a user’s stake. The liquidity reward is added to the return on lending
market, in this case the CFMM. From Synthetix’s smart contracts [40], one finds that ϕi(pistake(h)i) =
PSNX
Psynth
when the agent is sufficiently collateralized, where PSNX and Psynth are the prices of SNX and the synthetic
respectively. Mean lending return is γt = γbt +R
λi
λ where γbt is the expected return offered by the CFMM,
R is the absolute SNX liquidity reward and λiλ is the relative amount lent by agent i to total lent assets.
Note that with this choice of φ, we need to relax the first boundary condition of equation (1) to allow
ϕi(pistake(h)i) ≤ 1. This difference in boundary condition does not mutate any of the formal results in §3,
but does affect the results of §4.3. We also note that decentralized derivatives from the Vega protocol [41]
have a pricing mechanism similar to ϕi that has been studied and found to have stable Nash equilibria [42].
In the Tezos protocol, stakers (termed “bakers”) may choose to provide their assets to on-chain CFMMs
while retaining a portion of their staking rewards [43]. In effect, forgone staking returns can be seen as an
interest rate for borrowing against staked assets in order to supply them to on-chain lending (the CFMM).
For positive reductions in staking reward, φi is a submartingale whose positive drift is determined by foregone
staking return. In the Polkadot [44] PoS system, staking derivatives are managed by an independent protocol
that accepts deposits of staked PoS tokens (DOTs) and issues staking derivatives (L-DOTs) in exchange [45].
Staking-as-a-service businesses wherein users delegate their stake and outsource staking operations to a third
party may also issue staking derivatives to their clients, as discussed in [46] in the case of the Harmony PoS
protocol. Such examples are simpler to analyze, as default risks are concentrated in the customer base of
the service provider.
A construction of an explicit redemption price between synthetic and staked assets for second-layer
proof-of-stake protocols on Ethereum is considered in [47]. Such protocols may include L2 sidechains, DeFi
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Figure 2: Figure of a Po´lya urn sample process [50]. The initial distribution of balls follows a Dirichlet(2, 1, 1)
distribution. After the first ball is drawn (light blue), another one is added in. This process is repeated to
get to the final state. Note that the convergence to Dirichlet(2, 1, 1) comes from [51, §3.1.2]
protocols, and off-chain privacy protocols that require main-chain staking such as [48, 49]. In this proposal,
an on-chain CFMM is endowed with a portion of the PoS protocol’s native assets, which are used to facilitate
exchange between the staking asset and a staking derivative. The CFMM automatically enforces a target
value for φ, which is typically growing uniformly with time. When the staking derivative asset is undervalued
relative to the target price, staking revenues from the CFMM’s reserves are diverted to purchasing the
synthetic. Similarly, if the synthetic is overvalued relative to the target, reserves are sold to the CFMM to
restore the price. Note that in this work we study the resulting price process φ and our approach is agnostic
to the particular enforcement mechanism.
DeFi lending protocols have begun to offer credit using reserves supplied to CFMMs as collateral. For
example, Aave allows a user who has supplied reserves to a Uniswap pool to gain partial liquidity on their as-
sets by borrowing using liquidity pool shares as collateral [31]. While these examples do not explicitly involve
PoS and are thus outside the scope of this work, our results can easily be adapted to similar applications.
3 Concentration of Wealth
We will first consider a two-component model where each agent is represented as a validator whose assets are
either staked or borrowed. This model will provide a stochastic process that evolves the stake distribution
pistake(h) ∈ ∆n and the derivative distribution δ(h) ∈ ∆n. We extend the simple PoS models of [3, 2] for each
validator i and block height j, where a single validator is chosen as a block producer and given a reward. In
our extension, we assume that a validator loses a fraction ι ∈ (0, 1) of their stake when slashed.
3.1 Probability Space
In order to describe the probabilistic nature of slashing and how it affects defaults, we define a probability
space via the state transitions that occur when a validator is slashed. Let pi be the probability that the
ith validator is slashed (c.f. Assumption 3 in Appendix B). For our scenario there are four outcomes for
validator i at block height h:
1. Rewarded and Not Slashed, E1: This leads to a pistake(h)i = pistake(h − 1)i + Rh and occurs with
probability Prh[E1|i] = (1− pi) · pistake(h)i
2. Not Rewarded and Not Slashed, E2: This leads to no change in stake, pistake(h) = pistake(h − 1) and
occurs with probability Prh[E2|i] = (1− pi)(1− pistake(t)i)
3. Slashed but no default, E3: This leads to a change in stake of pistake(h)i = (1 − ι)pistake(h − 1)i and
occurs with probability Prh[E3|i] = pi(1− 1pistake(h)i<cipistake(h)i)
4. Slashed and defaulted, E4: This leads to a stake change of pistake(h)i = 0 which occurs with probability
Prh[E4|i] = pi1pistake(h)i<cipistake(h)i
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We denote the set of possible outcomes for a validator as E = {E1, E2, E3, E4}. As the probabilities of these
events change as a function of block height, we have an infinite sequence of probability measures Prh on E .
Note that if you are slashed, it overrides whether you won a reward or not, matching the policies of the two
largest staking networks, Tezos and Cosmos.
Unlike the compounding block rewards of [2], there are a number of differences when slashing is intro-
duced. Without slashing, the stochastic evolution of pistake(h) is increasing in that the money supply at
height h, Sh = ‖pistake(h)‖1, is increasing in block height h. With slashing, this is not true, as the stake lost
due to slashing makes the monetary supply non-monotonic. However, the model contained in [2] considers a
situation where a selfish mining adversary causes the monetary supply to be non-increasing as a function of
height. The authors of [2] analyze this by considering the evolution of pistake(h) as a Po´lya urn process and
add in adversarial behavior via what is termed4 ‘time-dependence’. In order to handle slashing, we generalize
this Po´lya urn model to handle the removal of stake in a manner that is a superset of the adversarial scenario
of [2, §4].
3.2 Urn models
Urn models were first introduced by Po´lya and Eggenberger in 1923 [52] to study contagions in epidemiology.
These models have been used in a variety of fields, including in the analysis of randomized branching
algorithms [53, 54] that are common in blockchains. The simplest urn model considers an urn filled with r
red balls and g green balls. A ball is drawn from this urn and another ball of the same color is added. For
instance, if a red ball is drawn with probability rr+g , then another red ball is added, so that the probability
of a subsequent red draw is r+1r+1+g (see figure 2 for a reference). The sample paths of this process exhibit the
‘rich-get-richer’ phenomenon for certain initial conditions, where the urn ends in a state with one dominant
color. Urn models have been studied with systems that have n balls and such that the sampling process
is enriched with more complex replacement strategies. Moreover, these models serve as the prototype for
exchangeable random processes, which are permutation-invariant but not uncorrelated stochastic processes.5
In [2], the authors model a PoS system as an urn with balls of n different colors. Each ball represents a
validator and the initial stake distribution pistake(0) represents the number of balls of each color at the chain’s
genesis. When a ball of color c is selected, Rh c-colored balls are added to the urn. In the adversarial scenario
of [2, §3], a selfish validator represented by color c can cause the monetary supply to remain unchanged6
even though a new block is mined. The selfish validator coerces the sampling procedure into giving the
selfish validator 2Rh c-colored balls while removing Rh c
′-colored balls, where c′ is the color of an honest
validator. This occurs when a selfish validator publishess two blocks whose root is at height hcurrent − 1
which invalidates an honest validator’s block at the current block height hcurrent as the selfish validator’s
chain is longest.
Generalized urn models allow for balls of color c to affect the concentrations of balls of other colors. These
models are specified by a replacement matrix R ∈ Zn×n. The entry Rc,c′ is the number of balls of color c′
to add when ball c is drawn. When Rc,c′ < 0, we remove Rc,c′ balls of color c
′ from the urn when a ball of
color c is drawn. This allows for the urn model to act like a birth-death process, where certain draws of one
color reduce the likelihood of other colors being drawn in the future. In the previous adversarial validator
example, if we only have two validators (n = 2), then the replacement matrix for the selfish mining strategy
is,
R =
[
2Rh −Rh
0 Rh
]
= Rh
[
2 −1
0 1
]
(4)
where the first row represents an adversary’s draw, while the second row represents the honest participant.
4This ‘time-dependence’ can be characterized by a Po´lya urn that allows for the removal of balls, as in the model presented
in the next section
5de Finetti’s theorem says that all exchangeable stochastic processes are representable via a sequence of urns with a particular
replacement strategy [55]
6This is because the selfish mining adversary causes an honest participant’s block to become an orphan, leading to a loss of
block reward for the honest miner and a gain for the adversary
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Suppose that we initially start with a stake distribution pistake(0) ∈ Zn. At block height h, a validator
v(h) is selected based on the stake distribution, e.g. v(h) ∼ pˆistake(h). Then, we update the stake distribution
as:
pistake(h) = pistake(h− 1) + Rv(h) (5)
where Rv(h) is the v(h)-th row of R. With this framework, there are a number of results that provide limit
laws for the distribution of terminal stake, pˆistake = limh→∞ pˆistake(h), which depend on R. For instance,
if R = sI, e.g. a constant multiple of the identity matrix, then pistake(h)hs → Dirichlet(pistake(0)), where the
convergence is in distribution [55, 56]. On the other hand, if we perform this update with the replacement
matrix of eq. (4), then most of the results of [2] (e.g. the stochastic domination results for certain strategies)
are direct corollaries of the birth-death limit laws of [57, Theorems 1, 2].
As described in §3.1, slashing introduces another set of non-determinism that affects replacement. To
incorporate this effect, we will need the replacement matrix to be random and respect the probabilities
described in §3.1. This means that each row will be drawn from a distribution, or equivalently, each row is
a probability measure. In particular, the ith row of a replacement matrix with slashing has the form:
Ri = Prh[E1|i]δRh + Prh[E2|i]δ0
+ Prh[E3|i]δ−ιpistake(h−1)i + Prh[E4|i]δ−pistake(h−1)i (6)
where δx is the Dirac measure (point mass) on x ∈ R. It was recently shown by [58, 59] that under
mild conditions, measure-valued replacement matrices such as eq. (6) have similar convergence results to
traditional Po´lya urn schemes. This allows for us to prove properties about the concentration of stake in the
presence of staking derivatives, extending the analysis of [2]. We further study this model by more realistic
Monte Carlo simulation in §3.4.
3.3 Formal Properties
We will prove some formal properties about the distribution of terminal staking distributions based on the
update rules of equations (5) and (6). In order to prove these results we will need to make some further
assumptions on the growth of the money supply and epoch lengths, which are detailed in Appendix B.2. We
first note that the results of [58, Theorem 1.4] and [59, Theorem 1.3] guarantee7 that under the evolution
of equation (5), there exists a stationary measure ν on the set of probability distributions on ∆n such that
pˆistake = limh→∞ pˆistake(h) ∼ ν. Note that all proofs of claims made can be found in Appendix D.
First, we make a claim about the survival probability of a validator:
Claim 1. Let γ be the probability that a validator eventually loses all of their stake. Then γ = Pr[pˆistake,i =
0] = pi1−pi
Note that if the slashing probability is less than 50%, then a validator will be guaranteed to survive (e.g.
have positive stake if pi <
1
2 as γ is increasing in pi and γ|pi= 12 = 1). Next, we consider the distribution
of stake of an individual validator at block height h. We study this using continuous-time embeddings of
urn proceses. These methods, pioneered in [61, V], take a discrete time trajectory Xi (such an urn process)
and embed it into a continuous time process X(t). Events τ1, . . . , τn, . . . are drawn independently from a
memoryless distribution such that X(τi) represents the ith birth-death event. If X(t) is constructed correctly,
then the laws of {Xi}i∈N and {X(τi)}i∈N are equal in distribution. Using a construction for an embedding
from [62], we are able get an explicit distribution for pistake(h)i under the assumptions of this section.
Claim 2. If pi <
1
2 , let βi =
1−pi
1−2pi For all h > 0, pistake(h)i = e
(Rh−(1+ι)pi)hXi, Xi ∼ (1− γ)Γ(1, 1βi ) + γδ0
where Γ(k, θ) is the gamma distribution.
7We note that [60] first proved results for infinite color Po´lya urns which [58] extended to general measure-valued replacement
matrices. However, both of these papers assume as ‘balancing’ condition, akin to that of detailed balance in the MCMC
literature, that effectively forces ∀i, ∑j Rij = B for a constant B ∈ R. [59] removes this condition, which allows for the process
defined by equation (6) to be well-defined.
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Firstly, this claim suggests that when pi >
1
2 , we should expect a validator’s stake to decay exponentially
towards zero. Moreover, if all validators have the same slash probability, e.g. ∀i, pi = p, then the expected
concentration of the stake distribution is controlled by the variance of the random variable X as,
ℵ = E
[‖pistake(h)i‖2
‖pistake(h)i‖1
]
=
E[
∑n
i=1X
2
i ]
E[
∑n
i=1Xi]
=
σ2X + µ
2
X
µX
= σX
(
σX
µX
)
+ µX (7)
where Xi are i.i.d. copies of X and µX , σ
2
X are the mean and variance of X, respectively. For this X
distributed via the law in Claim 2, µX = β, σX = (1 − γ)2µ2X so ℵ = β(1 + (1 − γ)2). This effectively says
that the default probability has a sizeable effect on concentration, such that when it is difficult to default
(γ = 0), we expect higher concentration than when validators have a higher likelihood of ruin. Note that
the ratio of the L2 to L1 norm of a non-negative vector is a dissimilarity measure akin the Gini coefficient,
with high concentration meaning high ℵ and low concentration8 occurring when ℵ = 1n .
We note that one can remove constant block reward assumption of assumption 11 and have inflationary
rewards (in the sense of [3]) with an increase in complexity to the distributional equation of the claim.
Finally, we consider how the synthetic price, ϕi(pistake(h)i) behaves under certain regularity conditions:
Claim 3. Suppose ∃s ∈ (0, 1) such that φ is L-Lipschitz on I = [s, 1] and ∃x ∈ I such that φ(x) = x. Then
for all i,
ρ(L) = Pr
[
lim
h→∞
ϕi(pistake(h)i) = x
∣∣∣∣∀i, pistake(h)i ∈ I] > 0
with ρ(L) decreasing in L. Further, ∃ > 0 such that an -sized neighborhood of the fixed point x will be
visited infinitely often.
This claim says that if the stake distribution stays in a ‘safe’ regime (which is defined by the Lipschitz
parameter L), then the price of the synthetic will infinitely often visit a fixed point of φ. In the case of a
staking derivative, this condition is guaranteed to hold as φ(1) = 1. However, for DeFi uses, such as the
Synthetix curve in §2.1, this implies that certain synthetic prices will be visited infinitely often as trading
continues. This recurrence property for the staking derivative prices suggests that if the system avoids
‘unsafe’ regions (e.g. regions where the synthetic price exceeds the underlying price by a bounded function
of L), then the price process should oscillate around a fixed point of φ. If the fixed point is a peg value (e.g.
$1 for a stablecoin), then this claim suggests that choosing φ such that L is small and s is as close to 0 as
possible, then one can bound the maximum deviations from the peg value (e.g. the fixed point x).
3.4 Simulations
In order to provide a more realistic understanding of how the urn model behaves, we turn to Monte Carlo
simulation. We relax Assumptions 9, 10, 12, and 11 and allow for agents to have a borrow probability,
β, that represents their likelihood to borrow against their staked assets. Our simulations use four ideal
functionalities that do the following functions:
1. update borrowers: For each borrower i, flip a coin with probability βi to decide if a loan is needed. If
i hasn’t borrowed more than cipistake(h)i, borrow a random fraction of our stake that is less than the
collateral limit.
2. mark loans at current height: Compute ϕi using φ and equation (2)
8If pistake(h) = Shδi,j , e.g. there is a dictator, then E
[ ‖pistake(h)i‖2
‖pistake(h)i‖1
]
= 1. If pistake(h)i =
Sh
n
, for all i, then
E
[ ‖pistake(h)i‖2
‖pistake(h)i‖1
]
= 1
n
. This ratio’s similarity to the Gini coefficient can be viewed as a reasonable proxy for Gini [63]
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Figure 3: (Left) A heatmap of f(a, b) = Eh[Gini(pistake(h))|λborrow = a, λslash = b]. (Right) A heatmap
of f(a, b) = Eh
[
‖pistake(h)‖2
‖pistake(h)‖1
∣∣λborrow = a, λslash = b]. The phase transition line between highly concentrated
(yellow) and more uniform (blue) stake distribution is more clear in the Gini coefficient plot.
Figure 4: (Left) A heatmap of g(a, b) =
√
Varh[Gini(pistake(h))|λborrow = a, λslash = b]. (Right) A heatmap
of g(a, b) =
√
Varh
[
‖pistake(h)‖2
‖pistake(h)‖1
∣∣λborrow = a, λslash = b]. We can see that there is a quantitative similarity
between the standard deviation for the Gini coefficient and the norm ratio. The main feature to observe is
that there is a sharp transition from no variance to a sizeable amount of variable.
3. clean defaulted loans: Find loans that have defaulted (e.g. ϕ > ϕmax) and zero the stake and the
borrowing balance of the borrowers. Note that the network burns assets when this happens, reducing
the money supply.
4. update stake distribution: Draws slashes (sampling pi) and block producers (via pistake) to update the
current stake distribution and increase the money supply.
Full algorithmic descriptions of these functionalities and parameters can be found in Appendix C.1. When a
validator defaults on a staking derivative — pistake(h)i < cipistake(hissued)i — we set their stake to zero. This
has the effect of reducing the money supply and effectively giving all other validators an increase in future
expected rewards, as pˆistake(h)j increases for all validators j 6= i. We made this choice of default policy based
on those discussed within existing proposals [5]. These functionalities are combined into a main simulation
loop, which performs Monte Carlo sampling of trajectories for pistake(h). The two most important variables
are λslash and λborrow, which represent the average probability for a validator to get slashed and to borrow
via a staking derivative, respectively.
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In Figure 3, we see a heatmap of the expected Gini coefficient as a function of λslash and λborrow for an
inflationary monetary policy with λ = 1. The left-hand figure of the expected Gini coefficient shows a stark
transition between highly concentrated stake distributions and much more diffuse stake distributions. This
transition line, which roughly corresponds to λslash =
5
4λborrow − 1, shows that at high borrowing demand
and relatively high slashing rates, one should expect to see a more diffuse stake distribution. An explanation
for this reduction in inequality is that once borrowing demand is high, even the larger participants end up
minting staking derivatives and when they are slashed, they effectively redistribute their stake to smaller
validators.
Above the critical line, λslash =
1
2 , we see that the two measures are similar and report similar amounts
of concentration. As we move away from the critical line, we see that the Gini coefficient continues to stay
concentrated, whereas the norm ratio disperses. This difference between Gini and the norm ratio is expected
amongst exponential family distributions [63]. However, both figures clearly illustrate that when there is a
high borrowing demand and non-trivial slashing, staking derivatives can reduce inequality substantially.
Figure 4 shows the standard deviation of the Gini coefficient and the norm ratio as a function of
λborrow, λslash. Note that the scale is between [0, 0.5] since the maximum variance for measures that take
value in [0, 1] is in this range. We again see a phase transition between no variance and positive variance
around the lines λborrow =
4
5 (1− λslash) and λborrow > 0.5, suggesting that there are large qualitative shifts
in the evolution of pistake along this line. While the norm ratio figure doesn’t have as sharp of transition
as the Gini coefficient, it is clear that there is still an indication of increased turnover in this metric. This
suggests that once borrowing demand is high enough and slashing likelihoods go up, we should expect less
concentration and we should expect there to be sizeable variance in the level of concentration that exists.
Combined, these results suggest that if there is a non-negligible likelihood to be slashed and a fair
amount of borrowing demand, then one should expect more uniform stake distribution. This suggests that
PoS protocol designers hoping for a fairer token distribution can utilize staking derivatives to achieve these
goals. Moreover, the results for the norm ratio confirm the analysis of equation (7), which says that higher
slashing probabilities lead to more uniform stake distributions.
4 Derivative Returns and Portfolio Selection
A natural question to ask about staking derivatives regards their effect on expected staking returns. In order
to study how derivatives impact rewards, we model the returns process of the derivative. We then use this
model to study how returns are affected when validators only borrow from the protocol (e.g. all lending is
handled by the PoS protocol) and when there are external lending opportunities (akin to [3]). These results
are compared to traditional pricing models for fixed-income derivatives with embedded options to provide
some economic intuition for the financial trade-offs faced upon the introduction of derivatives.
4.1 Derivative Returns Process
In this section we study the return dynamics of staking derivatives and their dependence on the staking
returns described in §3.1. We denote the returns to staking for agent i at block height h with rs(h)i,
such that an agent that has staked pistake(h − 1)i in the previous epoch will begin the current epoch with
pistake(h)i = (rs(h)i + 1)pistake(h − 1)i. For example, returns will be positive if the agent is rewarded and
negative if the agent is slashed. We define ψ(rs(h), h) = φi ((rs(h)i + 1))pistake(h− 1)i)
= φi(pistake(h)i). This emphasizes that the value of the staking derivative is a function of the stake in the
current epoch and the incremental staking return. We assume agents select mean-variance-optimal portfolios
[64] consisting of positions in staking and derivatives. The staking returns process can be derived from the
assumptions in §3.1. To estimate the relevant moments of the return distribution of the derivative asset, we
denote the derivative returns for epoch t by rd(t)i, and write
rd(t)i =
ψi(rs(t+ 1)i, t+ 1)
ψi(rs(t)i, t)
− 1 (8)
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In order to guarantee finite moments, we work in the safe regime where the derivative is not liquidated.
Given ψ smooth, we can estimate the mean return to the derivative with the second-order approximation
µd(t)i ≈ Bi(t) +
σ2si
2
Ci(t) (9)
where
Bi(t) =
ψi(µs(t+ 1)i, t+ 1)− ψi(µs(t)i, t)
ψi(µs(t)i, t)
Ci(t) =
1
ψi(µs(t), t)
∂2ψi(µs(t+ 1), t+ 1)
∂r2s
Equation (9) states that one can estimate the mean derivative return by a “base-scenario” return component
given by Bi(t) (for example, this can be a fixed interest rate that the borrower pays the protocol for
borrowing against stake) plus a correction factor proportional to volatility. This factor is driven by Ci(t),
which, following fixed-income terminology, we refer to refer to as the “factor convexity” of ψ. The adjustment
term in (9) can therefore be thought of as the “cost of convexity” [65, Chapter 11] and is proportional to
the square of volatility. For example, for a variance in staking returns of σ2si = 20%, each unit increase in
the factor convexity results in a 10% gain in µd. This term captures the impact of non-linear effects on
the derivative from staking. The most common example involves liquidation as a result of slashing, which
produces a nonlinear loss to derivative borrowers. In most practical applications, the cost of convexity will be
positive as liquidations compound losses from slashing. The expected losses from liquidation are increasing
in the volatility of staking returns, which may indicate, for example, a higher probability of slashing.
We can also think of the cost of convexity as capturing the net of effect of embedded options in the
staking derivative. An instructive analogy is that of bond options in fiat finance. We analogize φ to a bond,
maturing at the end of the epoch, that the borrower issues to the protocol. If the validator is slashed within
the epoch, the protocol may enforce early prepayment of the outstanding principal by seizing the validator’s
stake. This functions similarly to a put option on the staking asset that protects the protocol from downside
losses (and produces a non-linear loss for the validator). Other examples of non-linearities may involve forms
of “credit scoring” as suggested in [66] that increase costs if borrowers become riskier during the epoch. In
general, when the protocol has the right to change the terms of the loan within the epoch, the value of φ
will have a positive cost of convexity for the borrower. On the other hand, if the borrower has the right
to close out their loan before maturity, one can think of φ as embedding a call option for the borrower (a
“callable bond” is one that the issuer has the right to redeem prior to its maturity). If unfavorable staking
returns result in higher borrowing costs during the epoch, the borrower is protected as they can buy back
the derivative and close their loan. This would reduce the cost of convexity of the derivative. In this section,
we only allow borrowers to rebalance at the start of the epoch and assume the protocol enforces liquidations.
This results in a positive cost of convexity that leads the mean return in (9) to exceed the base return Bi(t)
due to the value of the “options” held by the protocol. While we expect network participants to directly
price these options in practice, in this work we are content with approximating their impact through the
cost of convexity term in (9) and leave explicit pricing to future work.
For the variance terms in the derivative asset, we use a second-order approximations for the covariance
term σsd and a first-order approximation for the variance, σd: σ
2
di
≈ σ2siD2i (t) σsdi ≈ σ2siDi(t) where
Di(t) = − 1
ψi(µs(t)i, t)
∂ψi(µs(t+ 1)i, t+ 1)
∂rs
which we refer to as the “factor duration” of ψ with respect to the staking returns. It captures the sensitivity
of ψ to changes in rs. Intuitively, duration measures the percentage change in ψ of an infinitesimal change
in rs. Given the restriction that φ be declining in its arguments, Di(t) will be non-negative, meaning the
staking derivative will have positive factor duration. In the portfolio selection context, Di is best understood
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as a risk measure. When Di = 0, the derivative has no dependence on staking return and functions similarly
to a risk-free asset with a deterministic growth given by Bi(t). The derivative asset will offer higher volatility
than staking when Di > 1 and lower volatility when Di < 1. Informally, this can also be thought of as a
leverage effect, dampening or magnifying exposure to volatility in staking returns. We note that the results
in the following sections assume Di 6= 1.
4.2 Staking and Derivatives
We first consider the case where agents seek to maximize their wealth in terms of a two-component portfolio
of staked and derivative assets. Agents are assumed to have varying risk preferences and asset endowments
and optimize their portfolio allocations based on observed mean and variance characteristics of staking and
derivative assets. We assume agents select an optimal weight vector wi = [wsi , wdi ]
T that maximizes the
standard quadratic utility function
f(wi,µi, λi,Σi) = w
T
i µi −
1
2
λiw
T
i Σiwi (10)
where λi is an agent-specific risk-aversion parameter and
µi(t) =
[
µs(t)i
µd(t)i
]
Σi(t) =
[
σ2si Di(t)σ
2
si
Di(t)σ
2
si D
2
i (t)σ
2
si
]
(11)
We consider the constrained case where agents are restricted to solutions that satisfy wT1 = 1. Note
that this models differs from that of [3] where returns to PoS and on-chain lending are assumed to be
independent. Here, we explicitly model covariance between the staking and derivative returns. Furthermore,
this covariance term depends on the duration of ψ, which can be tuned by the PoS protocol.
Claim 4. The change in portfolio weights satisfies
‖wi(t+1)−wi(t)‖1 ≤ |U (Di(t)) ||∆µs(t)+∆µd(t)|+
∣∣∣∣ ∆D(t)(Di(t+ 1)− 1)(Di(t)− 1)
∣∣∣∣×|µs(t+1)+µd(t+1)+1|
where ∆(x(t)) = x(t+ 1)− x(t) and
U(Di(t)) =
{
Di(t)
Di(t)−1 , if Di(t) > 1
1
Di(t)−1 , if Di(t) < 1
(12)
This claim states that the total turnover in the agent’s portfolio is driven by two factors: change in mean
returns and change in duration, as shown in the first and second terms of (12) respectively. The sensitivity
to changes in mean return depends on duration, as shown in the first term in (12). When duration is either
very large or close to zero, then the worst-case rebalancing can be bounded by the absolute change in the
mean vectors. When duration approaches one from either direction, the system will become unstable and
highly sensitive to changes in the mean vector. Intuitively, in these situations, the variance and covariance
terms of the derivative will approach the staking volatility, causing the relative attractiveness of the two
assets to be highly sensitive to changes in their mean returns. The second term in (12) captures the change
in weights due to changes in duration. When duration is stable (∆D is small), rebalancing will be driven
primarily changes in mean returns. When ∆D is large in proportion to D2(t), the sensitivity of the derivative
to changes in the staking returns will create the possibility of a large rebalancing event. For example, D
may jump as the validator approaches the collateralization ratio, since a small change in staking returns may
wipe out the validator’s stake. This may prompt the validator to rebalance to avoid liquidation. Overall,
when duration is either very large or close to zero and is stable then the worst-case rebalancing will be no
greater than the change in the mean returns to the two assets. These changes in mean vectors will result
from changes in the PoS protocol’s policy vis-a-vis the agent. Assuming the PoS network’s monetary policy
is consistent, the change in mean staking return for a given quantity staked is likely to be minimal. Note
17
that from (9), the change in the derivative is given by ∆µd(t) = ∆Bi(t) +
σ2s
2 ∆Ci(t), which is the change in
the static return plus the change in convexity. This illustrates two approaches that the protocol can take to
a change in the borrower’s risk level. For example, if a borrower becomes riskier, the protocol may charge a
higher ‘interest rate’ (increasing the base return Bi(t)) or alternatively may increase cost of convexity for the
borrower, for example by increasing collateral requirements. In isolation, either action may prompt riskier
validators to rebalance to safer weights.
4.3 Staking, Lending, and Derivatives
We incorporate an on-chain lending into the model of the preceding section, extending the model in [3] to
three-asset portfolio selection. Agents select an optimal weight vector wi = [wsi , wdi , w`i ]
T that maximizes
the convex objective function f(wi,µi, λi,Σi) = w
T
i µi − 12λiwTi Σiwi where
µi(t) =
µs(t)iµd(t)i
µ`(t)i
 Σi(t) =
 σ2si Di(t)σ2si 0Di(t)σ2si D2i (t)σ2si 0
0 0 σ2`i
 (13)
where µ`, σ` are the mean and volatility for on-chain lending respectively. Staking and derivative returns
are assumed to be independent of lending returns (σs` = σd` = 0). In this case, we have the following claim
Claim 5. The agents allocation to the lending asset is given by w`(t)i =
1
σ`iλi
(
IRi(t)
Di(t)−1 + µ`i(t)
)
where
IRi(t) = Bi(t)−Di(t)µs(t)i + σ
2
si
2 Ci(t)
The term IRi(t) can roughly be viewed as approximation of the “instantaneous return” of ψ as shown
in [67, P3]. Note that the instantaneous return varies subtly from the mean return in (9). The former
approximates the return to the derivative over an infinitesimal period, re-scaled to the length of the epoch.
For example, if one were to simplify rs to a continuous-time process drs = µsdt + σsdB(t) where B(t) is
a Brownian motion, then applying Itoˆ’s lemma and taking the expectation E
[
dψ(rd(t),t)
ψ((rd(t),t))
]
will generate the
instantaneous return. IRi(t) is comprised of a base return component given by Bi(t), a drift return given
by Di(t)µt(t), and a diffusion term given by
σ2si
2 Ci(t). In the case where D > 1, lending will be increasing
in µd and decreasing in µs. As limDi(t)→∞ w`(t)i =
1
σ`iλi
(µ`i(t)− µsi(t)) (users avoid the derivative and
lending competes only with staking). In the case where D < 1 and IRi(t) is positive, the staking derivative
reduces on-chain lending demand. If D = 0, then the derivative becomes akin to risk-free instrument
and w`(t)i =
1
σ`iλi
(µ`i(t)− µdi(t)). Finally note that in the case where IRi(t) = 0, on-chain lending is
unconstrained by staking and derivative returns w`(t)i =
µ`i (t)
σ`iλi
.
4.4 φ-specific results
By restricting the functional forms of φ, one can better classify the ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ regimes for a staking
derivative. First, we relate the rate of growth of φ to the staking volatility σ2si . We find there is a regime
where the derivative’s price does not affect the expected mean returns. When in this regime, in-protocol
borrowing via φ can be easily managed by the protocol and liquidations (e.g. borrower defaults) do not
significantly affect the net capital staked.
Claim 6. Suppose that ∃I ⊂ [0, 1], I compact such that φ, ∂φ, ∂2φ are L-Lipschitz on I. Furthere, suppose
that Pr[|∆µs(t)i|+ |∆µ`(t)i| > L ] = 1−2−O(). Then with probability 1−2−O(), the change in mean return,
µi(t+1)−µi(t) can be uniformly bounded by a function that doesn’t depend on µd(t+1), µd(t) when L < 2σ2si
The condition L < 2σ2si
can be though of as a ‘liquidity’ condition. Intuitively, this corresponds to high
volatility in returns increasing the likelihood of liquidations. When liquidations are large and happen fre-
quently, the system tends to be more equal, which means large changes to the ROI of validators whose
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stake is slashed (akin to §3.4). Claim 6 says that validator ROI in the presence of derivatives is also low-
ered when the volatilty in staking and lending returns is high. Suppose that φ(s) = 1
sk
and φ′(s) = −k
sk+1
.
With some algebra, Claim 6 then implies that ROI is unaffected9 if all borrowers take out loans of size
less than s∗ ≈
(
k
k+ 2
σ2si
) 1
k+1
. When σ2si  1, s∗ → 1, which corresponds to validators being extremely
overcollateralized and capital inefficient (see App. 2, Figure 1).
Note, however, that when we are outside of the region L < 2σ2si
, the derivative begins to be more important
to validators to hold. The main reasons for this are:
1. Validators would rather get leverage and liquidity via the derivative (which is in-protocol rather than
externally, when φ is constructed such that L > 2σ2si
)
2. The derivative is more important for validator portfolios in volatile regimes (e.g. σ2si  1)
3. Validators’ aggregate borrowing affects their staking ROI and they can potentially improve their ROI
by borrowing (e.g. going leveraged long on the PoS asset)
The first point suggests that φ can be chosen in a way such that most lending of a PoS asset takes place via
the derivative as opposed to an out-of-protocol lending mechanism. This allows protocol designers to avoid
the pitfalls of [3], where out-of-protocol lending could drain the security of a PoS network.
Claim 6 effectively says that a choice of φ for a staking derivative effectively places a prior belief on
the maximum value that σ2s can achieve. For specific φ, we conjecture that there is a sharp transition as a
function of the gradient of φ:
Conjecture 1. Suppose that we are in the two-component model (e.g. (10)). Let σ2si > 1, φ(s, k) =
1
sk
∧ 1.
Then wd(t) > 0 ⇐⇒ k ≤ 1.
This conjecture shows a sharp transition: When k > 1, validators do not use the borrowing facilities of
the staking derivative. We next numerically validate this conjecture and expand it to the three-component
model via agent-based simulation.
4.5 Simulation
We extend the simulations of §3.4 to handle lending and varied risk preferences. The main addition that we
have is to model the mean returns and covariances from equation (13) and we have to replace the random
borrowing policy with a Markowitz updates. Our simulations use the convex optimization package cvxpy to
solve the Markowitz problem [68].
4.5.1 Two-component Model
First, we simulate the two component model of (10), eliding r`(t). Precise details on the simulation algorithm
and parameters used can be found in Appendix C.2. In Figure 5, we see a heatmap of Et[ws(t)] as a function
of the slashing probability λslash and the exponent k. This simulation lends support to Conjecture 1 and
illustrates that even in high slashing regimes, borrowing becomes attractive. Note that as λslash increases,
the stake weight decays. This is because each slash causes a liquidation (e.g. loss of the stake), leading to a
decayed stake weight. Simulations of this form can also be used to set and estimate borrowing fees, as the
protocol can design fees taken upon issuing a loan to be such that Et[ws(t)] ≥ 12 .
9Assume we start at s = 1. Then the ∂φ Lipschitz condition gives, for s′ ∈ (0, 1)
∂φ(s′)− ∂φ′(1) = k
(
1− 1
s′k+1
)
≤ 2
σ2si
(1− s′)
Approximating a maximum s′ by elision of terms of order s′k+2 and higher yields the approximation.
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Figure 5: Plot of Et[Ws(t)] (left) and
√
Vart[Ws(t)]. The phase transition suggested in Conjecture 1 is clearly
apparent and we can see that there is high uncertainty until we reach the low slashing and/or degree regimes.
4.5.2 Three-component Model
The algorithmic description of the simulation model that includes both lending and derivatives can be
found in Appendix C.1. Figure 6a illustrates heatmaps of the expected stake weight, ws(λslash, k) =
E[ws(t)|λslash, k] and expected lent weights, w`(λslash, k) = E[w`(t)|λslash, k]. Note that the x-axis is logarith-
mic. We can see that there is a sharp transition along a curve λslash = a(log k)
c for some a > 0, c > 1 between
regions of high staking and low staking. When this threshold is crossed, we find that rational agents migrate
their stake to borrowing from the staking derivative. The borrow weight, wd(λslash, k) = E[wd(t)|λslash, k]
can be seen in Figure 6b. In this figure, we see that as we flatten φ(s) = 1
sk
by decreasing k, we incentivize
rational validators to start borrowing against their stake in an increasingly aggressive manner. This aggres-
sive borrowing leads to a high number of defaults (Figure 6b). We quantify this further by looking at the
supply ratio s(h) which is equal to s(h) = ‖pistake(h)‖1Sh . This represents ratio of the total money supply at
height h relative to the maximum possibly supply Sh. In Figures 7a, 7b, 7c this is illustrated for deflationary,
constant, and inflationary monetary policies, respectively. Firstly, note that when the slashing fraction ι is
higher, we have a higher supply fraction for most values of λslash and k. This is because the higher slash
fraction ι leads to validators moving more assets to lending due to the higher default risk when using the
staking derivative. One can see this directly by noting that the lending weights in Figure 6a are higher
when ι = 0.35. Finally, observe that we can increase the supply ratio by having an increasingly inflationary
monetary policy. Combined, these results show that while we can reduce inequality as in §1 by adding
derivatives, we also end up reducing the ROI for validators as a large fraction of the money supply must be
burned to compensate for defaults in the derivative.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have explored how staking derivatives affect network security for both PoS and DeFi. We
first constructed a general framework for defining staking derivatives that encompass most of those seen
in PoS and DeFi. Then, we were able to analyze this model by using analytical techniques (with stricter
assumptions) and via agent-based modeling. We found that inequality in PoS systems can sometimes be
mitigated by the existence of staking derivatives. The phase transition between the concentrated and non-
concentrated regimes can be studied via measure-valued Po´lya urn processes, presenting new avenues to
measure inequality under more realistic scenarios.
Subsequently, we estimated validators’ return on investment and found that the return profile of a
portfolio of derivatives and staked assets resembles a portfolio of bonds and options on bonds. In this
analysis, we found that when the derivative pricing curve was smooth and in a ‘safe’ region far away from
liquidation, we could compute the expected returns and the convexity correction. This implies that there
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(a) Portfolio weights for staked, ws (top) and lent, w` (bottom). These simulations were performed with a constant
reward monetary policy and a ι = 0.05 (left) and ι = 0.35 (right). One can see the sharp transition, where borrowing
dominates (transition happens around λslash ∝ (log k)c). Note that the higher slash fraction ι, leads to more diffuse
weights.
(b) Portfolio weights for derivative borrowing (top) and the fraction of defaulted validators (bottom). We see the
same transition from the other weights and it is clear that the higher slash fraction leads to a larger optimal region
(e.g. parameter area where wd ≈ 0.5). 21
(a) Supply Ratio with a deflationary monetary policy and a ι = 0.05 (left) and ι = 0.35 (right). We see that the
higher slash fraction (right) leads to less burning of stake and a much smaller unsafe region (e.g. where the supply
ratio is 0, which means that the entire money supply was burned via bad derivative lending)
(b) Supply Ratio with a constant monetary policy and a ι = 0.05 (left) and ι = 0.35 (right). We note the same trend
in ι as the previous figure, but note that the supply ratio is higher with a non-deflationary policy. This mirrors and
confirms the results of [3]
(c) Supply Ratio with a inflationary monetary policy and a ι = 0.05 (left) and ι = 0.35 (right). Again, notice the
increase in the magnitude of supply ratio, similar to [3]
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is an embedded option that the PoS protocol holds when derivatives are issued. This embedded option
provides many avenues for protocol developers to shape their network. For instance, it can be tuned (via the
derivative pricing function) to collect fees on derivatives, reward ‘good’ validators, and as a form of insurance
against capital flight. In particular, our results show that there are scenarios under which the derivatives
market (which is in-protocol) can become the primary borrowing market for a staked asset. This provides
a mechanistic way for a protocol designer to avoid the capital flight of [3], provided that they can choose a
viable derivative pricing function.
The work presented here opens up further investigations in a number of directions. First, the observed
phase transition between the ‘concentrated’ and ‘diffuse’ stake distributions can likely be formally character-
ized. The tools of measure-valued Po´lya processes are likely the key to proving these types of transitions and
we suspect they will be of Galton-Watson type [61, III]. Secondly, we did not probe the estimated returns in
the ‘unsafe’ regime (e.g. when expansions such as equation 9 do not hold), which is likely where one expects
to see more dramatic fluctuation in returns of the derivative. Thirdly, we do not explore how validators
and market participants explicitly price credit risk in the staking derivative and are instead satisfied with
approximations for mean and variance that suffice to describe portfolio dynamics. A barrier to using the
traditional credit models of [69, 70] is that the probability of default and the value that the PoS protocol
can recover from the validator following default are highly dependent in the case of PoS derivatives. It is
likely that the model we develop in §3 can accommodate recently-developed credit risk models [71, 72] that
employ urns to explicitly account for dependence between default and recovery processes [73]. Finally, spe-
cializing this work to specific forms of the derivative pricing function, especially DeFi pricing functions (e.g.
Synthetix) will likely yield new results about the unsafe region. Analyzing empirical attacks and failures of
these systems can also help shed light on how to construct optimal derivative pricing functions.
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A Notation
We will use the following mathematical notation:
• ∆n is n-dimensional probability simplex, ∆n = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn :
∑n
i=1 xi = 1,∀i, xi ≥ 0}
• For any x ∈ Rn, we define the p-norm as ‖x‖p = (
∑n
i=1 |xi|p)1/p.
• We turn any nonzero vector x ∈ Rn with x ≥ 0 into a probability distribution by defining xˆ = x‖x‖1 ∈
∆n.
• We let Rh be the block reward at height h and the total money supply at time t is defined by
St =
∑t
h=0Rh −Bt, where Bt is random variable describing the total burned token supply at time t
• pistake(t) ∈ St∆n is the unnormalized stake distribution, where pistake(t)i is the ith validators stake at
time t
• Sn+ ⊂ Rn×n is the cone of positive definite, symmetric matrices
• ∨,∧ are the standard join and meet of two elements of a lattice. For example if a, b ∈ R, a ∧ b =
max(a, b), a ∨ b = min(a, b)
• We use standard Landau notation [74] on totally ordered setsD: Given functions f : D → R, g : D → R,
we use the following asymptotic notations:
– f ∈ O(g) ⇐⇒ ∃C > 0,∀d ∈ D, f(d) ≤ Cg(d)
– f ∈ Ω(g) ⇐⇒ ∃c > 0,∀d ∈ D, f(d) ≥ cg(d)
– f ∈ o(g) ⇐⇒ limd→supD f(d)g(d) = 0
– f ∈ Θ(g) ⇐⇒ f ∈ O(g) and f ∈ Ω(g)
We also note that the title of the paper is inspired by Bonneau’s “Why buy when you can rent?” [75].
This paper details attacks against PoW currencies that occur when there are liquid hash power derivatives
(“renting”), which are the PoW equivalents of a staking derivative.
B Assumptions
B.1 Common Assumptions
The assumptions described in this section are those that apply throughout the paper. The first two assump-
tions match those from previous work on PoS [2, 3].
Assumption 1. There is a deterministic money supply function Sh that is the money supply at block height
h. This supply function is known to all participants ahead of time and the height h block reward, Rh, is such
that Sh =
∑
h′≤hRh′ .
Assumption 2. There are a fixed number of validators, n ∈ N, for all time.
The next assumption says that a validator’s likelihood of being slashed is static. This simplifying as-
sumption ignores correlation between validator behavior, but does allow for variance in the likelihood of
each validator being slashed. Note that this is not a particularly strong assumption, as we can relax this
significantly by assuming that all validators have upper bounds on their slashing probabilities.
Assumption 3. Each validator i has a static (e.g. not changing in time) slashing probability pi
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Similarly, we assume that the collateral factor (e.g. maximum fraction one can borrow against their
stake) is static. This is a very reasonable assumption, as it is unlikely that collateral factors will be dynamic
as they are static in DeFi [18].
Assumption 4. Each validator i has a static maximum collateral factor ci ∈ (0, 1), which means that the
validator can borrow at most ci% of their stake
There is also a global assumption on the slashing percentage:
Assumption 5. There exists a static slashing percentage ι ∈ (0, 1) that represents the percentage of a
validators stake that is burned upon a slash
Next, we assume that validators are weakly rational in that they only commit resources to the network
if they have a positive expected return:
Assumption 6. We assume that validators are weakly rational in that they only have non-zero stake
committed to the network at block height h iff their expected returns for block h are non-negative
We utilize epoch-based staking derivatives as staking derivatives for Cosmos [5] and Tezos [43] do this.
We also note that the liquidation period for Synthetix is a fixed time window [30], which provides a similar
effect to this assumption.
Assumption 7. Validators can only borrow from the network at the beginning of an epoch and they must
repay their loans by the end of the same epoch
Finally, we utilize the simple PoS model of the staking and lending paper:
Assumption 8. We will assume a simple PoS model akin to what was used in [3], albeit slashing rates
defined on a per validator basis.
B.2 Assumptions for §3.3
The following technical assumptions are needed to utilize generalized Po´lya urn results directly. They can
be relaxed, at the cost of making the replacement matrix significantly more complex.
Assumption 9. The epoch length η is 1 (e.g. one epoch, one block)
Assumption 10. All validators are maximizing their staking derivative borrows (e.g. ∀h, δ(h) = cipistake(h)i)
Assumption 11. We assume that Rh is constant and for all h,Rh > (1 + ι)pi
Assumption 12. Validators can only be slashed when they are selected to be a block producer
Note is a somewhat realistic assumption, as a number of staking protocols have reduced their slashing
penalties for being offline (which is the most common infraction) and increased their penalties for double
signing and/or equivocation.
C Simulation Algorithms
C.1 Model from §3.4
The parameters used in our Monte Carlo simulation are:
• Initial stake distribution: pistake(0)← (dpi1e, . . . , dpine) where pii ∼ Exp(λstake).
• Stake distribution at beginning of the loan: p˜istake(hissued)
• Collateral Factors: c ∈ [0, 1]n where ci ∼ Beta(λcollateral, 1).
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• Borrow Probability: β ∈ [0, 1]n where βi ∼ Beta(λborrow, 1)
• Slash Probability: p ∈ [0, 1]n where pi ∼ Beta(λslash, 1)
• Outstanding Loans: ` ∈ Rn≥0 that keeps track of the outstanding quantity of derivatives minted by a
validator.
• Maximum Block Height: hmax ∈ N is the maximum block height that a simulation was run
• Monetary policy parameter: λ ∈ R We used disinflationary and inflationary monetary policies charac-
terized by Sh = O(e
λh) for inflationary policies and Sh =
1−λh
1−λ for disinflationary policies.
• Derivative Pricing Function: k ∈ R+ is the degree in the function φ(s) = 1sk ∧ 1
Note that we chose an exponential stake distribution as a model of an unequal, concentration stake dis-
tribution with Gini coefficient equal to 12 , e.g. Gini(pistake(0)) =
1
2 . This distribution of wealth has been
observed in western countries, including the US [76]. Moreover, the simulations we ran were run un-
til block height hmax = 200, 000 and we generated 100 trajectories for each combination of parameters
(λstake, λcollateral, λborrow, λslash). The generative model uses four ideal functionalities:
1. update borrowers
2. mark loans at current height
3. clear defaulted loans
4. update stake distribution
The ideal functionalities do the following:
Algorithm 1 update borrowers(`, β, c, pistake)
for i ∈ {1, . . . , nvalidators} do
X ∼ Binomial(βi)
if X == 1 ∧ `i < cipistake(h)i then
ξ ∼ Unif([0, 1])
borrow_amt_as_percentage_of_stake ∼
(
ci − `ipistake(h)i
)
× ξ
`i ← borrow_amt_as_percentage_of_stake ×pii
end if
end for
Algorithm 2 mark loans at current height(c, pistake, `, p˜istake, h)
for i ∈ {1, . . . , nvalidators} do
if `i > 0 then
b← ci1−ci
a← 1p˜istake(hissued)i(ci−1) hissued is the last epoch height, e.g. bhη c
ϕi ← φ(apistake(h)i + b)
end if
end for
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Algorithm 3 clean defaulted loans(ϕ, pistake, h)
for i ∈ {1, . . . , nvalidators} do
if ϕi > ϕmax then
pistake(h)i ← 0 Validator defaulted
βi ← 0
end if
end for
Algorithm 4 update stake distribution(pistake, p, h, ι, Rh)
s← 0 ∈ Rn+ Vector of validator slashings
for i ∈ {1, . . . , nvalidators} do
si ∼ Binomial(pi) Sample slashes from slashing probability distribution
end for
i ∼ pˆistake
if si == 0 then
pistake(h+ 1)i ← pistake(h)i +Rh Add block reward to winning validator
end if
for j ∈ {1, . . . , nvalidators} do
if sj > 0 then
pistake(h+ 1)j ← (1− ι)pistake(h)j
end if
if j 6= i ∧ sj == 0 then
pistake(h+ 1)j ← pistake(h)j
end if
end for
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Algorithm 5 Main Simulation Loop
# Initialize Variables
h← 0
n← Number of Agents
pistake ← pi ∼ Exp(λstake) Initial token distribution pi
p˜istake ← pistake Stake distribution at last epoch
η ← Epoch Time
`← 0 ∈ Rn
c ∼∏ni=1 Beta(λcollateral, 1) Sample collateral factors
β ∼∏ni=1 Beta(λborrow, 1) Sample borrow probabilities
p ∼∏ni=1 Beta(λslash, 1) Sample slashing probabilities
ι← Bond Size Percentage of stake is slashed
ϕ← 1 ∈ Rn
Rh ← Block Reward emission function
# Run simulation until completion at time Tmax
while t < Tmax do
if t ≡ 0 mod η then
update borrowers(`, β, c, pistake)
p˜istake(hissued)← pistake We annotate p˜istake with hissued for clarity
end if
mark loans at current height(c, pistake, `, p˜istake, hissued, h)
clear defaulted loans(ϕ, pistake)
update stake distribution(pistake, p, ι, Rh)
update block reward(h)
h += 1
end while
C.2 Model from §4.5
We model the returns vector as follows
r(t)i =
rs(t)ir`(t)i
rd(t)i
 =
 pˆistake(t)iγt
ψi(rs(t)i,t)
ψi(rs(t−1)i,t−1) − 1
 (14)
where γt is defined in [3, §3.2.1]. In addition to the parameters described in 3.4, we have the following
additional parameters:
• Risk aversion parameter, λi ∼ χ2(n): By having λi (see (10)) as χ2, we allow for the expected number
of risky agents to increase linearly in n.
• Staking return variance, σ2si : We model the staking return variance via a stochastic process, akin to a
‘volatility of volatility’ model from mathematical finance. We use i.i.d. Cox-Ingersoll-Ross processes:
dσ2si(t) = (κ− σ2si(t))dt+ ξσsi(t)dB(t)
where dB(t) is the standard Brownian measure and κ, ξ are drift and diffusion parameters. This model
has been successfully used to model bond options (a close analogue of staking derivatives) in traditional
finance [77].
The new simulation resamples σ2si(t) on each time step, updates the covariance matrix, and then recom-
putes the validators exposure using a Markowitz method [64]. In this simulation, we make the following
assumptions:
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• Each derivative borrower that isn’t slashed within an epoch completely repays their loan by the end
of the epoch
• Each on-chain loan is also repaid on epoch boundaries
The simulations of §3 can be constructed by setting the lending returns to zero. Thus, without the loss of
generality, we are only going to present the algorithm of §4.5. We replace the update borrowers functionality
of the last section with a new functionality described below. Furthermore, we introduce two new ideal
functionalities that we describe below:
• update markowitz: This computes the optimal Markowitz portfolio using cvxpy [68].
• get returns and covariance: This computes the returns vector µ and the covariance Σ for agent i
We also add a lending distribution pilend which represents the assets that the agent is supplying to an external
lender (e.g. Compound). Note that µ ∈ Rn×3 and Σ ∈ Rn×3×3 can be thought of an arrays of validator
returns and covariances. The term γt is the rate computed by the Compound smart contract, computed
exactly as described in the appendix of [3]. Finally, note that we assume access to an oracle that computes
a sample path from a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process. We denote by CIR(α, β, σ, t) a time t sample from a CIR
process with parameters α, β, σ.
Algorithm 6 get returns and covariance(µprev, pistake, pilend, `, i, h, γt)
µ(t)← (0, 0, 0)
if ‖pistake‖1 > 0 then
rs ← pistake(h)i‖pistake(h)‖1
µ(t)0 ← rs
δ ← −φ′(rs)φ(rs) δ is duration
else
µ(t)0 ← 0
δ ← 0
end if
if `i > 0 then
µ(t)1 ← φ(rs)φ(µprev[i]0) − 1 If ∃i, `i > 0 then ‖pistake‖1 > 0
else
µ(t)1 ← 0
end if
µ(t)2 ← γt
Σ(t)←
1 δ 0δ δ2 0
0 0 0

Σ(t)2,2 ∼ CIR(α, β, σ, t)
k ∼ CIR(α, β, σ, t)
Σ(t)← k ∗Σ(t)
return µ(t),Σ(t)
D Proofs
D.1 Proof of Claim 1
This follows directly from [62, Lemma 2.1], once we map the setup of §3 to their problem. In [62], one
constructs a Po´lya urn such that if a ball of color c is chosen, then in their notation, with probability plemma,
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Algorithm 7 update markowitz(µprev, pistake, pilend, `, γt, λ)
w ← 0 ∈ Rn×3 weight array for all agents
for i ∈ {1, . . . , nvalidators} do
if pistake(h)i > 0 then
µ,Σ← get returns and covariance(µprev, pistake, pilend, `, i, h, γt)
w[i]← MINIMIZE(µ− λw[i]tΣw[i]) Use convex optimizer to min. strongly convex obj.
end if
end for
return w
Algorithm 8 update borrowers(µ, pistake, pilend, `, p˜istake, λ)
p˜istake ← pistake
γt ← compute borrow rate(pilend) Algorithm from [3]
`← 0 ∈ Rn Reset borrowers, assume anyone left repaid in full
w ← update markowitz(µ, pistake, pilend, `, γt, λ
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
ω ← pistake(h)i + pilend(h)i wealth of ith agent
ωs, ωd, ωl ← ω × w[i]0, ω × w[i]1, ω × w[i]2
if ωs + ωd > pistake(h)i then
δ ← (ωs + ωd − pistake(h)i)
pilend(h)i ← pilend(h)i − δ
pistake(h)i ← pistake(h)i + δ
end if
# The branch below is for taking out new derivatives
if ωs < pistake(h)i ∧ ωd < pistake(h)i then
`i ← ωd
pistake(h)i ← pistake(h)i − ωd
end if
if ωl > pilend(h)i then
δ ← ωl − pilend(h)i
pilend(h)i ← pilend(h) + δ
pistake(h)i ← pistake(h)i − δ
end if
end for
a ball is added of the same color, and with probability 1 − plemma a ball is added whose color is selected
uniformly at random but is not equal to c. The first scenario represents a validator being selected and
receiving a block reward, whereas the latter scenario represents a validator being selected and being slashed.
As we have made assumption 12, this maps to our scenario with plemma = 1− pi.
D.2 Proof of Claim 2
We modify the arguments made in [62] and sketch how they apply to our scenario. The Po´lya urn pro-
cess pistake(h) embeds into a continuous time Markov branching process X(t) where X(0) = pistake(0) [61,
v.9 Theorem 1]. This birth-death process adds Rh + 1 balls (the block reward plus the ball taken out of the
urn) to X(t) and removes one ball (the sampled ball from an urn). Moreover, this process has arrival times
τi ∼ Exp(1) [61, III], which we will denote τ1, τ2, . . . , τn, . . .. At τ1, we can write a recurrence equation for
X:
X(t) = 1t≥τ1Y (X
′(t− τ1) +X ′′(t− τ1)) + 1t<τ1
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where Y ∼ Bern(1 − pi). The first term represents either a jump to zero (e.g. Y = 0) or a branching that
starts two new processes at time t− τ1. The second term represents the fact that we start the process with
one ball (akin to the S(0) = 1 urn assumptions in [2]). By [61, III.9 Theorem 1], limt→∞X(t)e−αt = W
and X(t)e−αt is a non-negative martingale for α = E[Ri] = Rh(1 − pi) − ιpi if α > 0 (which is assumption
11). By Doob’s martingale convergence theorem, this converges to a limit that satisfies the distributional
equation
U = e−ατ1Y (U ′ + U ′) (15)
We now apply [62, Lemma 2.1] to receive the result. The proof in that paper involves showing that
• (1− γ)Γ(1, 1β ) + γδ0 satisfies equation (15) and has finite variance
• Showing that the operator T that maps X(t) to X(t+ ) is a contraction mapping
• Applying a modified Banach fixed point theorem (from [54]) yields that (1 − γ)Γ(1, 1β ) + γδ0 is the
unique distribution to satisfy equation (15)
D.3 Proof of Claim 3
This result follows from mapping the staking derivative setup to the stochastic approximation of functions
of Po´lya urn processes of [78, 79]. Stochastic approximation, first invented by Robbins and Monro, is the
same as stochastic gradient descent, which is commonly found in the machine learning literature. If we have
an urn process Xn ∈ ∆d, stochastic approximation considers an urn evolution,
Xn+1 = Xn + n (F (Xn) + ξi)
where n is a ‘step size’ and ξi is a random vector with finite moments and F : Rd → Rd is a vector field.
We require, via standard arguments [79, Thm. 2.2.3] that i = Θ
(
1
n
)
in order for this process to have a non-
trivial probability of convergence for continuous F . Let ϕ(pistake(h)) = (ϕ1(pistake(h)1), . . . , ϕn(pistake(h)n))
and consider a stochastic approximation Xn where F = ϕ. Recall that a downcrossing fixed point of a
function F : R+ → R+ is point p such that a) F (p) = p and b) ∃I ⊂ R+ such that p ∈ I and ∀p′ < p, p′ ∈ I
we have F (p′) > p. Equation (1) tells us that ϕi(1) = 1 and ∀s < 1, ϕ′(s) ≤ 0, implying that 1 is a
downcrossing fixed point. This implies that (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rn is a stable point of ϕ — ∃A ∈ Rn×n such that
∃N ⊂ Rn, (1, . . . , 1) ∈ N such that ∀x ∈ N, 〈A(x − f(1, . . . , 1)), x − (1, . . . , 1)〉 ≥ 0. From [79, Thm. 2.2.8],
if p is a stable point of a function F , then Pr[limn→∞Xn → p] > 0, which proves the first part of the claim.
Let An() = {|Xn − (1, . . . , 1)| > } be a Borel set in the Borel σ-algebra for an urn process. Since
Pr[limn→∞Xn → p] > 0, ∃′ > 0 such that
∑
n Pr[An(′)] < ∞. The Borel-Cantelli lemma immediately
yields the second part of the claim.
D.4 Proof of Claim 4
We can show that agents select a portfolio given by
wi(t) =
wsi(t)wdi(t)
γ1
 =
 λσ2si λiDi(t)σ2si 1λiDi(t)σ2si λiD2i (t)σ2si 1
1 1 0
−1µsi(t)µdi(t)
0
+
00
1
 = (A(t))−1(µi(t) + e4)
Define ∆Di(t) = D(t+ 1)−D(t) and note that the time evolution of A(t) depends only on duration
A(t+ 1) = A(t) +
 0 ∆Di(t)λiσ2si 0∆Di(t)λiσ2si (D2i (t) + 2∆Di(t)Di(t))λiσ2si 0
0 0 0
 = A(t) + ∆(t) (16)
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by the Sherman-Morrison formula for rank-k updates [80, 81], we have
(A(t) + ∆(t))−1 = A(t)−1 + X(t) (17)
where
X(t) = −(I + A(t)−1∆(t))−1A(t)−1∆(t)A(t)−1 (18)
It can be shown from the definitions of ∆ and A (16) and (D.5) that
‖A(t)−1‖1 = max
(∣∣∣∣ Di(t)Di(t)− 1
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ 11−Di(t)
∣∣∣∣, 1) (19)
which is
∣∣∣∣ Di(t)Di(t)−1
∣∣∣∣ when Di(t) > 1 and ∣∣∣∣ 1Di(t)−1
∣∣∣∣ when Di(t) < 1. It can also be shown that
‖X(t)−1‖1 =
∣∣∣∣ ∆D(t)(Di(t+ 1)− 1)(Di(t)− 1)
∣∣∣∣ (20)
we therefore have
‖wi(t+ 1)−wi(t)‖1 = ‖ (Ai(t) + ∆i(t))−1 (µt+1 + e4)−A−1(µt + e4)‖1 (21)
≤ ‖A−1‖1‖(µt+1 − µt)‖1 + ‖X‖1‖(µt+1 + e4))‖1 (22)
Substituting (19) and (20) gives the desired result
D.5 Proof of Claim 5
The optimal portfolio weights are given by
wi(t) =

wsi(t)
wdi(t)
w`i(t)
γ
 =

λσ2si λiDi(t)σ
2
si 0 1
λiDi(t)σ
2
si λiD
2
i (t)σ
2
si 0 1
0 0 λσ2`i 1
1 1 1 0

−1

µsi(t)
µdi(t)
µ`i(t)
0
+

0
0
0
1

 = (A(t))−1(µi(t) + e4)
where γ is a Lagrange multiplier. The result follows directly by taking the corresponding entry of wi(t).
D.6 Proof of Claim 6
As ψi, ∂ψi, ∂
2ψi are Lipschitz, the error term of the 2nd order Taylor expansion of φ at r is bounded by
R2(r
′) = O(Lσ2si). Thus for any  > 0, if σ
2
si <

L , then
R2(r
′) = |E[ψi(µs(t+ 1), (t+ 1)]− ψi(µs(t+ 1), (t+ 1)) + ∂2rsψi(t)σ2s/2| <  (23)
Writing out µd(t) gives:
µd(t) =
Et[ψi(rsi(t+ 1)i, t+ 1)]
ψi(rsi(t)i, t)
− 1
≈
ψi(µs(t+ 1)i, t+ 1) +
σ2si
2 ∂
2
rsi
ψi(µs(t+ 1), t+ 1)
ψi(µs(t)i, t)
− 1
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Therefore, when |∆µs|+ |∆µ`| < L , we have
|µd(t+ 1)− µd(t)| ≤
∣∣∣∣∆Bi(t) + σ2s2 ∆Ci(t)
∣∣∣∣+ 2
≤
∣∣∣∣∆Bi(t)∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣σ2s2 ∆Ci(t)
∣∣∣∣+ 2
≤
∣∣∣∣∆Bi(t)∣∣∣∣+ Lσ2si2
∣∣∣∣ 1ψi(µs(t+ 1)i, t+ 1) − 1ψi(µs(t)i, t)
∣∣∣∣‖µt+1 − µt‖1 + 2 (24)
Equation (24) combined with Claim 1 of [3] yields:
‖µt+1 − µt‖1 = |µs(t+ 1)− µs(t)|+ |µ`(t+ 1)− µ`(t)|+ |µd(t+ 1)− µd(t)|
≤ C
(
∆stakei (t)
St
+ ∆lend(t)
)
+
∣∣∣∣∆Bi(t)∣∣∣∣+ Lσ2si2
∣∣∣∣ 1ψi(µs(t+ 1)i, t+ 1) − 1ψi(µs(t)i, t)
∣∣∣∣‖µt+1 − µt‖1 + 2
≤ C
(
∆stakei (t)
St
+ ∆lend(t)
)
+ |ψi(µs(t+ 2)i, t+ 2)− ψi(µs(t+ 1)i, t+ 1)|+
Lσ2si
2
‖µt+1 − µt‖1 + 2
≤ C
(
∆stakei (t)
St
+ ∆lend(t)
)
+ L|∆stakei (t+ 1)|+
Lσ2si
2
‖µt+1 − µt‖1 + 2
where the second inequality uses ψ ≥ 1 and the last line uses the Lipschitz condition. This implies that(
1− Lσ
2
si
2
)
‖µt+1 − µt‖1 ≤ C
(
∆stakei (t)
(
1 +
1
St
)
+ ∆lend(t)
)
+ 2 (25)
If L < 2σ2si
, then this equation illustrates that the change in mean vector only depends on staking and lending
returns.
37
